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U.S. and in Europe
In order to transport data packets from one Internet access services network to 
another, transmission via Internet backbone services networks is required. Both 
are Internet traffic services based on telecommunications capacities, combined 
with Internet logistics (transmission protocols, Internet protocol, routers etc.). 
Telecommunications capacities are produced by local telecommunications infra-
structure as well as long-distance telecommunications infrastructure. Internet 
access services require not only local telecommunications infrastructure but also 
long distance telecommunications infrastructure capacities. Complementary to 
Internet traffic services, Internet application services are provided, including 
e-mails, file sharing, Voice over IP, Video games, search machines and other 
content delivery services. 
The network neutrality debate is gaining increasing momentum worldwide. Its 
focus is on the regulation of Internet traffic management. The most extreme ver-
sion of mandatory network neutrality would be to transform the traditional 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) into a technical regulatory concept. Since 
TCP assigns all data packets equal priority, best effort average traffic quality 
results endogenously without any traffic quality guarantee. Due to the transition 
from narrowband access to broadband access congestion management by TCP is 
challenged. As a consequence, a growing debate on traffic quality regulation has 
developed. Whereas in Schwartz, Weiser (2009, 1) the term network neutrality
has been used as a regulatory concept addressing which deviations from the TCP 
should be permitted, the focus of the current debate increasingly moves towards 
specific forms of traffic management regulation.
Two different opposing approaches to traffic management regulation became 
relevant in the U.S. and in Europe. The net neutrality debate in the U.S. has al-
ready a rather complex history. The Network Neutrality Act of 2006, focusing 
on net neutrality regulations, in particular the obligation of broadband network 
providers not to impose a surcharge for prioritization or quality of service, never 2
became law.
1 Since then the FCC and related Supreme Court Cases on its statu-
tory competence to deal with net neutrality have played an increasingly larger 
role (FCC 2010). In this context the FCC differentiates between reasonable net-
work management and unreasonable discrimination (FCC, 2010b, 40 ff.). Pay-
ing for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and In-
ternet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered 
unreasonable discrimination, because an incentive would occur to erode the 
quality of service provided to non-prioritized traffic (FCC, 2010b, 18, 43). In 
contrast, differential treatment of traffic enabling users to choose quality of ser-
vice enhancements could be reasonable (FCC, 2010b, 41).
In Europe the starting point of the network neutrality debate was the Commis-
sion declaration on net neutrality (European Commission, 2009b, C 308/2): 
“…the creation of safeguard powers for national regulatory authorities to pre-
vent the degradation of services and the hindering or slowing down of traffic 
over public networks”. Furthermore, Directive 2009/136/EC, Article 22 states: 
“…, Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are able to 
set minimum quality of service requirements on an undertaking or undertakings 
providing public communications networks”.
2 Based on this EU framework, 
there is currently a review of the German telecommunications law under consid-
eration focusing explicitly on requirements of minimal service quality.
3
1 Text of H.R. 5273 [109th]: Network Neutrality Act of 2006,
In par-
ticular § 45o deals with requirements of minimal service quality, which the Fed-
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5273
2 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Novem-
ber 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relat-
ing to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 337/11. See also Annex 3, Quality of 
service parameters (L 337/35).
3 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung telekommunikationsrechtlicher Regelungen, 
Stand 15. 09. 2010, 3.
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/referentenentwurf-
tkg,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf3
eral Ministry of Economics and Technology may issue and transmit to the Fed-
eral Network Agency. 
Although minimal quality regulation and prohibition of priority pricing are dif-
ferent regulatory interventions, they are both forms of traffic management regu-
lation. Their focus is on the best effort average traffic quality of the TCP and on 
regulations aimed at avoiding the deterioration of best effort traffic quality of the 
non-prioritized traffic. In the U.S., the regulatory focus of the FCC is in particu-
lar on broadband Internet access service providers with market power (FCC, 
2010b, 19 ff.). In contrast, the focus of the net neutrality debate in Europe is on 
minimal traffic quality requirements for universal service obligations for provid-
ers of public communications networks rather than market power regulation of 
Internet access service providers. However, the aim of both approaches of traffic 
quality regulation is to avoid the deterioration of best effort quality as a conse-
quence of traffic quality differentiation (FCC, 2010b, 43; Holznagel, 2010, 2). 
It is important to differentiate between mandatory network neutrality and market 
driven network neutrality. Mandatory network neutrality consists of ex ante reg-
ulation of traffic management based on the traditional TCP. In contrast, market 
driven network neutrality means an entrepreneurial search for traffic allocation 
in such a way that there are no incentives for the Internet traffic service provider 
to discriminate against possible Internet application services on the basis of net-
work capacity requirements. This is the case if any application is charged ac-
cording to the opportunity costs of the traffic capacities it requires (Knieps, 
2010). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section 2 the transition 
from edge based technical congestion management to an economically based 
traffic management in broadband Internet is demonstrated, taking into account 
the opportunity costs of traffic capacity. In section 3 a critical appraisal of traffic 
quality regulation is provided. It can be shown that neither market power nor 
universal service arguments can justify the prohibition of priority pricing or the 
regulatory requirement of minimum traffic qualities. In section 4 it is pointed 
out that market driven network neutrality requires the entrepreneurial search for 4
traffic quality differentiation and priority pricing as well as the evolutionary de-
velopment of minimal traffic qualities. 
2. From TCP to traffic quality management
2.1 TCP based best effort average traffic quality 
The reference point of traffic quality regulation is the best effort traffic quality 
resulting from TCP, assigning all data packets equal priority. Best effort average 
traffic quality results endogenously, depending on traffic level for each given 
capacity. The congestion level results from the amount of data packets sent ac-
cording to the technical protocol TCP at the end user’s computer and the availa-
ble bandwidth capacity. There is no traffic management and consequently no 
traffic quality guarantee. 
In narrowband Internet TCP-based best effort average traffic quality was suffi-
cient for two reasons. Firstly, all users required traffic for (at least roughly) ho-
mogenous narrowband applications, in particular e-mails, thus there was no need 
for heterogeneous traffic qualities. Secondly, the underlying technical algorithm 
to solve congestion problems was sufficient, because the possibility of the send-
er computers causing congestions was strongly limited due to the low narrow-
band Internet access capacities.
Due to the transition from narrowband to broadband Internet there has been a 
change in the meaning of best effort traffic quality based on Jacobson’s (1988) 
congestion and control mechanism. Whereas in narrowband Internet the result-
ing best effort average traffic quality remains sufficient for all applications feas-
ible, in broadband Internet there is an increasing relevance of capacity intense 
peer-to-peer (P2P) applications. As more users are provided with very high 
speed Internet access, their capability to cause congestion in Internet traffic be-
comes larger: “Many P2P applications consume as much bandwidth as they can 
find” (FCC, 2008, 66). As a consequence, average best effort traffic quality may 
deteriorate strongly. Moreover, capacity intense, time insensitive applications 5
(e.g. P2P file sharing) are discriminating against non-capacity intense, time sen-
sitive applications (e.g. voice over IP), so that average best effort quality is no 
longer sufficient to allow the provision of time sensitive applications. 
User restrictions complementary to TCP, e.g. a cap on the average user’s capaci-
ty, a throttling back of the connection speeds of high capacity users or other 
forms of contractual restrictions between end-user and traffic service provider, 
can limit the amount of data packets of the sender and thus influence congestion 
levels (FCC, 2008, 30; Wu, 2003, 158 ff.). However, they are rather inefficient 
measures for dealing with these increasing congestion problems and cannot pre-
vent deterioration of best effort traffic quality. Moreover, the requirements of 
sufficient traffic quality for delay sensitive applications cannot be guaranteed. 
As a consequence, best effort average traffic quality may be too low for delay 
sensitive applications and too high for some delay insensitive applications. 
Moreover, applications for which earlier best effort quality had been sufficient 
may require higher traffic quality levels than is provided by the deteriorated best 
effort quality as a consequence of capacity intense peer-to-peer applications. 
Incentives arise to shift from best effort TCP-based congestion management at 
the edge to traffic management by Internet traffic service providers. The increas-
ing importance of traffic management in broadband Internet has also been rec-
ognized by the FCC, differentiating between end-user controlled and broadband-
provider controlled practices (FCC, 2010b, 41). 
2.2 Innovations in traffic quality management architecture
The Comcast Case provides important insights into the future role of traffic 
management. Due to immense potentials and incentives for using capacity in-
tense and delay insensitive applications by means of P2P swarming systems, 
P2P programs, such as BitTorrent, enable all peer users in the swarm to share 
large files. As a consequence there results an increasing scarcity of Internet traf-
fic capacities. The Comcast network management was not based on economic 6
congestion pricing. Instead, Comcast applied an intransparent traffic manage-
ment practice blocking the BitTorrent P2P applications (FCC, 2008, 2-6).  
The question arises how transparent and non-discriminatory traffic management 
practices can solve the overusage problem of traffic capacities setting the proper 
incentives to take into account congestion externalities and to provide the re-
quired traffic qualities for delay sensitive as well as delay insensitive applica-
tions.
In broadband Internet TCP-based best effort average traffic quality faces two 
serious problems. Firstly, there is a heterogeneous demand for traffic qualities, 
depending on the delay sensitivity of the applications (voice over IP vs. P2P ex-
change). Best effort average traffic quality is not sufficient for delay sensitive 
applications during periods of network congestion. Secondly, capacity intense, 
delay insensitive applications can deteriorate best effort quality in such a way 
that more and more applications are hampered. Thus TCP-based best effort av-
erage traffic quality can be strongly impaired by a relatively small number of 
capacity intense applications. In the worst case not even e-mails could arrive in 
time.
Due to the problems of TCP in broadband Internet there is an increasing need 
for traffic management by traffic service providers. This requires the transition 
from TCP to flexible traffic management architectures, in order to reflect the 
heterogeneous demand for traffic quality and to implement economically based 
allocation mechanisms for traffic capacity. 
There is a variety of traffic architectures capable of implementing quality of ser-
vice differentiation. Two basic types of traffic quality differentiation architec-
tures have been developed: Integrated Services (IntServ) and Differentiated Ser-
vices (DiffServ). IntServ architecture guarantees quality of service by reserving 
resources along the path for each quality of service sensitive flow. Each router 
has to maintain per-flow state information which causes large scaling problems 
(Li et al., 2004, 90). IntServ supports end-to-end quality of service for a wide 
variety of IP applications, applying the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) 7
(similar to circuit-switched telephone networks) based on the priority informa-
tion in the packet header. Thus, the specification of quality of service of packet 
transmission is directly related to the specific application service provided. Each 
application service has the specific guaranteed transmission quality it requires.
In contrast, DiffServ architecture uses a much less subtle differentiation ap-
proach, classifying packets into an exogenously determined number of classes at 
the network edge. Only the edge routers (ingress or egress edge routers) perform 
packet classification based on the priority information in the packet header, 
whereas core routers inside each DiffServ domain only deal with aggregated 
traffic for given service classes (Chen, Zhang, 2004, 370 ff.). Within each 
DiffServ-enabled domain, forwarding of packets by routers is performed accord-
ing to traffic classes, not according to the flow they belong to. Thus, within a 
DiffServ domain, all packets belonging to a given quality of service class may
receive the same treatment, such that within one service class no priority rule is 
applied. Due to its scalability compared to IntServ, the DiffServ framework is 
considered particularly suitable for larger scale networks (Bouras, Sevasti, 
2004, 167).
The DiffServ scheduler router offers a predefined number of traffic classes using 
a strict priority schedule. A packet is inserted into the transmission buffer behind 
previous packets of the same traffic class but ahead of packets of a lower traffic 
class. The scheduler transmits the packets which are at the head of the buffer; 
packets at the tail of the buffer are dropped as soon as the buffer is full. Traffic 
quality can be measured by mean packet delay and packet loss. Applying a strict 
priority schedule, traffic classes are monotone with respect to traffic quality. 
Packets within a higher traffic class will be transported with lower delay and 
lower loss than packets within lower traffic classes (Jin, Jordan, 2005, 842).
Depending on the demand for high quality, medium quality and low quality traf-
fic, quality of service in different classes results endogenously. The carrier may 
provide a quality of service guarantee for the data packet transport within a qual-
ity of service class – irrespective of the forwarding rate of lower classes (Chen, 8
Zhang, 2004, 374 ff.) – defining a maximum allowable delay and packet loss. 
Alternatively, no quality of service guarantees may be offered. 
2.3 Economically based traffic management 
Quality of service based price differentiation is well-known from road pricing 
experiments. Experiments in the U.S. have attempted to make road pricing more 
appealing by giving motorists the option of travelling without toll on regular 
lanes or paying for congestion free high-quality lanes (Verhoef, Small, 2004, 
133 ff.). In an example with two parallel roads A and B and two heterogeneous 
user groups QA and QB, where users in group QA have a strong preference for 
uncongested trips and users in group QB have lower time preferences, price dif-
ferentiation can be applied, i.e., there will be a high price guaranteeing absence 
of congestion on road A, and toll free travel on road B. These partial road pric-
ing rules already result in high social welfare improvements, provided there are 
substantial heterogeneities in the preferences of the users (Small, Winston, Yan, 
2005).
A simple price differentiation rule to allow travelers with heterogeneous prefe-
rences for avoiding congestion to self-select was provided years ago by Paris 
Metro. Two classes of (homogenous) carriages were provided (first class and 
second class). The more expensive first class carriages resulted in lower conges-
tion, although all other characteristics of travel were identical. Odlyzko’s pro-
posal is to apply the same rule to Internet traffic (Odlyzko, 1999). Thus, a net-
work would be partitioned into separate logical channels, with different charges 
applied on each channel. Although no guarantee of traffic service quality is pro-
vided, on average higher priced channels will be less congested. Users self-
select into the different channels according to their preferences for avoiding 
congestion and the prices charged on the channels. “Paris Metro Pricing” has not 
only been considered for separate channels but also for priority scheduling. Od-
lyzko (1999, 141) also considers the case of priorities, where all packets with 
higher priorities would always be forwarded before packets with lower priori-
ties. According to “Paris Metro Pricing” packet prices should be monotonically 9
decreasing. Premium class packets with the lowest congestion level should pay 
the highest packet price, medium class packets should pay a medium price, and 
third class packets with the highest congestion level should pay the lowest price 
(which may be zero).
In the “Paris Metro Pricing” approach there are no qualities of service guaran-
tees for each class. In fact, traffic quality in each class results endogenously. But 
in order to provide sufficient levels of traffic quality for delay sensitive applica-
tions, guarantees of traffic qualities for prioritized traffic classes are required. 
Since traffic quality is directly related to congestion the goal is to combine con-
gestion management with traffic quality differentiation. The corresponding eco-
nomic principle is reflected in the concept of market driven network neutrality. 
Any application is charged according to the opportunity costs of the traffic ca-
pacities it requires, taking into account the increasing delay of lower class pack-
ets due to the transmission of higher class packets (see section 4). Applied to a 
three class differentiation a necessary condition for incentive compatibility of 
traffic quality differentiation is that priority service has to pay a higher price 
than medium service and medium class a higher price than the lowest class. 
Thus, there should be no regulatory prohibition of priority pricing.  
3. A critical appraisal of traffic quality regulation
In the following a critical evaluation of regulatory traffic management is pro-
vided. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service consider-
ations can justify the regulation of traffic management. In particular, heteroge-
neous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive ap-
plications requires quality of service differentiation and complementary priority 
pricing. In section 4 the concept of market driven network neutrality is applied 
to point out the importance of entrepreneurial unregulated traffic quality man-
agement. In particular, the irrelevance of best effort quality and the endogenous 
evolution of minimal traffic qualities are pointed out. 10
3.1 The argument of market power
The focus of the debate is on the question whether Internet application providers 
should be protected from the abuse of market power of Internet access providers 
(Economides, 2008, 210; FCC, 2010b, 19 ff.). Criteria such as relative market 
share, financial strength and access to input and service markets can only serve 
as a starting point for evaluating the existence of market power. Conjecturing a 
dominant position on the basis of market shares, for example, can lead to eco-
nomically unjustified criteria for government intervention in network industries. 
From a competition economics point of view, the use of ex ante, sector-specific 
regulatory intervention constitutes massive interference in the market process 
and thus requires a particularly well-founded justification based on modern net-
work economics. Obviously, the development of an ex ante regulatory criterion 
creates a need for a more clear-cut definition of market power.
It is necessary to differentiate between those areas in which active and potential 
competition can work and other areas, characterized by the combination of a 
natural monopoly and irreversible costs (monopolistic bottlenecks). A natural 
monopoly situation exists, if a single supplier can serve the relevant market at 
lower costs than several suppliers. Irreversible costs are no longer relevant for 
the decision making by established firms, in contrast irreversible costs are a cru-
cial factor for potential competitors, insofar as they must decide whether to in-
vest such costs in the market. A monopolistic bottleneck is characterized by 
network specific market power, because, due to the lower decision relevant 
costs, the incumbent has a credible threat that may discourage a second network 
operator from entering the market (Knieps, 2011, 18). 
The transmission of data packets belongs to the markets for Internet traffic ser-
vices. Due to the absence of irreversible costs in the provision of Internet logis-
tics, Internet traffic services do not possess the characteristics of monopolistic 
bottlenecks. They are, however, based on telecommunications infrastructure. 
Insofar as the markets for telecommunications infrastructure capacities have 
monopolistic bottleneck components, regulation may be necessary to guarantee 
competitive markets for traffic services. 11
Since the markets for long-distance telecommunications infrastructure capacities 
are competitive, the markets for Internet backbone services are also competitive. 
However, local telecommunications infrastructure capacities may possess the 
characteristics of monopolistic bottlenecks for which neither active nor potential 
substitutes are available. In the meantime increasing competition within local 
telecommunications infrastructures (local loops) can be observed worldwide. 
Competition has led to a considerable variety in technological platforms, e.g. 
optical fiber (FTTx), wireless networks (e.g. WiMax, UMTS or LTE), Commu-
nity Antenna Television (CATV) networks and satellite technology, as well as to 
an increase in product variety. In addition, because of these rapid developments, 
the local loop facilities in larger cities and agglomerations are increasingly los-
ing their status as monopolistic bottlenecks. Although it is not possible at this 
point to predict exactly how long it will take for the monopolistic bottlenecks in 
the local loop to disappear completely, the development of alternative access 
networks indicates that the potential for phasing out sector-specific regulation in 
telecommunications is strongly increasing (Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 
2007).
To the extent that local networks constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, ex ante
regulation appears justified. Since unregulated tariffs would enable owners of 
monopolistic bottlenecks to generate excessive profits, disaggregated price-cap 
regulation should be introduced to regulate the price level. It is important to re-
strict such price-cap regulation to those areas of telecommunications networks 
where market power due to monopolistic bottlenecks is a regulatory problem. In 
all other subparts of telecommunications networks, price setting should be left to 
competitive market forces.
In this context it is interesting to note the different regulatory frameworks in the 
U.S. and in Europe. Whereas in the U.S. broadband access has been strongly 
deregulated (FCC, 2004), in Europe access to the unbundled local copper loop 
as well as wholesale access to ducts of the last mile are still heavily regulated 
(Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2010, 1003 ff.). In any case, remaining monopoly prob-
lems with respect to local telecommunications infrastructures should be regu-12
lated at the roots and not used as justification for forbidding Internet access pro-
viders price and quality differentiation of Internet traffic.  
By means of access regulation of local loop bottleneck components the transfer 
of market power from the telecommunications network bottleneck components 
into the complementary Internet access service markets can be avoided. Thus, 
any regulation of contracts between access service providers and Internet appli-
cation service providers is not justified. As a result, the avoidance of network 
neutrality regulation is of great importance, because only then can the adequate 
market signals (congestion tariffs, quality differentiation etc.) be supplied to the 
content provider, leading to an endogenous and more efficient exploitation of 
the Internet traffic resources. 
3.2 The argument of Universal Service 
In liberalized telecommunications markets, universal services are an important 
political objective worldwide, focusing on the provision of nation-wide adequate 
and sufficient services. The number of questions initially arising from the de-
mand for universal services exceeds the number of clear political guidelines that 
it provides. These questions are, in particular: Which services should be pro-
vided universally as services of general economic interest? Which quality of 
universal services should be provided? Is a lowering of quality levels at the 
margins of an area of universal service provision acceptable or not? At what 
rates should universal services be offered? How should the suppliers of univer-
sal services be chosen? How should the provision of universal services be fi-
nanced?
Answering these questions requires political decisions. A society’s view as to 
which services should be subsidized is realized through the political process and 
may vary considerably over time. The question is whether technological change 
will in the future lead, at least in the long run, to a phasing-out of universal ser-
vices due to shrinking costs for the provision of traditional universal services. In 
this context, an increasing variety of the standards for universal service (scope, 13
minimum quality, prices, etc.) in different countries and regions is also conceiv-
able. When determining the scope of non-profitable universal services, the divi-
sion of labour, for instance between the federal authority, individual federal 
states, counties and municipalities must also be considered (Blankart, 2003).
Considering the disaggregated representation of the Internet (Knieps, Zenhäu-
sern, 2008, fig. 1, 122) the question arises at which submarkets universal service 
issues occur. Again it is important to differentiate between the markets for 
communications infrastructure capacities and the markets for Internet traffic 
services.
On the infrastructure level, the problem of a universal service and the related 
subsidy arises only for the case that in some areas local broadband access is not 
yet available. On March 16, 2010 the FCC released the National Broadband Plan 
(FCC, 2010a). Although the number of Americans who have broadband access 
at home increased from 8 million in 2000 to nearly 200 million in 2009, there 
are still 100 million Americans who do not have broadband access at home. The 
goal of the FCC is to reform universal service mechanisms to support the dep-
loyment of broadband access in high cost areas and to ensure that low income 
inhabitants can afford broadband (FCC, 2010a, XI). The goal of national broad-
band availability is that everybody in the U.S. should have access to affordable 
broadband infrastructure, which allows the provision of acceptable quality of 
service for the most common Internet applications (FCC, 2010a, 135). 
In September 2009 the European Commission issued guidelines for the applica-
tion of state aid rules to support the deployment of broadband infrastructure in 
areas where such infrastructures do not yet exist, in particular rural areas. The 
state aid guideline for broadband networks does not only focus on the funding of 
broadband networks as ADSL, but also of very high speed Next Generation 
Networks (European Commission, 2009a, C 235/8, C 235/12 ff.). In September 
2010 the European Commission initiated its Broadband Package. Among others 
the package consists of a communication entitled “European Broadband: invest-
ing in digitally driven growth” (European Commission, 2010). In particular, the 
Commission asked all member states to adopt plans for high and ultra high 14
speed broadband networks with implementation strategies including the provi-
sions for the necessary funding. In January 2011 the Commission approved the 
amount of € 1.8 billion in public funds (state aid) for the deployment of broad-
band networks aiming to ensure that everybody in the European Union has 
access to broadband infrastructures: “The approach has ensured that broadband 
networks are built in areas where nothing was available before and are made ac-
cessible to competing Internet service providers on non discriminatory terms”.
4
An increase of the penetration rate of end-users with high speed broadband 
access strongly increases the capacity usage of access service networks as well 
as backbone service networks. The Comcast case has shown that even a rather 
small group of users can strongly increase capacity usage of the traffic service 
provider’s network by using a peer-to-peer application (BitTorrent). Thus, a 
large number of users of high speed distribution services will potentially lead to 
strongly increasing capacity usage. As more users possess the capability to send 
or receive large amounts of data packets via broadband access, traffic capacity 
management by Internet access service and backbone service providers becomes 
increasingly more important. In conclusion, the increasing access to high-speed 
broadband infrastructure does not reduce the problem of scarcity of Internet traf-
fic capacities, but may strongly aggravate it. It creates an urgent need for con-
gestion based quality differentiation for broadband Internet traffic. 
On the level of Internet traffic services universal service problems may also 
arise. To the extent that Internet traffic for specific socially desired applications 
(tele-medicine, interactive video for schools etc.) should be used, best effort 
TCP average quality is not sufficient. Such applications require priority traffic 
with guaranteed traffic qualities. Instead of prohibiting priority pricing, a subsi-
dy for the required premium traffic services may be necessary. 
4 State aid: Commission approves record amount of state aid for the deployment of 
broadband networks in 2010, Press releases, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/54&format=HTML
IP/11/54, Brussels, 20.01.2011.15
4. Market driven network neutrality, priority pricing, and endogenous 
minimal traffic qualities
Internet traffic markets are characterized by active and potential competition. 
This includes competition between Internet Access Service Providers as well as 
between Internet backbone service providers. Internet traffic providers have free 
access to the market, since high profits achieved by one firm would have the 
immediate effect of attracting others. Often a newcomer enters the market with 
no intention of duplicating the established firm. The relevant point is active 
competition, achieved by means of technological and product differentiation and 
the introduction of new products and processes (Faratin et al. 2007; Knieps, 
Zenhäusern, 2008, 127 ff.). 
Since traffic quality is directly related to congestion externalities, the starting 
point for an economically founded approach is the pricing model of MacKie-
Mason and Varian (1995) for only one traffic class. The authors show the inter-
relation between optimal congestion charges and optimal investment in traffic 
capacities, based on the well-known congestion pricing model from transporta-
tion economics. An extension to multi-channel congestion pricing does not lead 
to traffic quality differentiation with quality guarantees. Instead, the introduction 
of traffic quality classes with traffic quality guarantees in the upper traffic 
classes is unavoidable. The interrelationship between congestion pricing and 
incentive compatible traffic quality differentiation can be achieved under appli-
cation of the DiffServ architecture (Knieps, 2010). 
In the following the congestion pricing model for different traffic quality classes 
is applied, in order to show the importance of priority pricing as well as the evo-
lutionary development of minimal traffic qualities.
4.1 Priority pricing and endogenous traffic capacity choice
The potentials of quality and price differentiation are to be exploited by each 
traffic service provider requiring entrepreneurial decisions on the number of 16
traffic qualities. The aim is to derive a pricing rule applying a quality of service-
based price differentiation of traffic classes. In order to achieve an incentive 
compatible traffic quality differentiation, prices in higher service classes should 
be higher than prices in lower service classes. The starting point for the devel-
opment of such price differentiation strategies are the opportunity costs of ca-
pacity usage.
It is important to differentiate between intraclass congestion externalities within 
a traffic class and interclass congestion externalities between traffic classes. In-
traclass externalities reflect the delays which an additional data packet causes 
for all other data packets of the same class. Interclass externalities reflect the 
delays which an additional data packet imposes on the data packets in the other 
quality classes. Due to the strict priority rule only upper traffic classes cause in-
terclass externalities to lower classes, but not vice versa. 
Assume that a traffic service provider has decided that data packets are classi-
fied and grouped into n different traffic classes.  it Q denotes the number of data 
packets belonging to the same traffic class i, i=1,…, n in period t.  it it Q P de-
notes the inverse demand for aggregated traffic in traffic class i.  w  denotes 
the capacity costs of the channel with the bandwidth w.
Let   w Q Q k nt t it , ,..., 1 n i ,..., 1  be the private (average) variable costs of a 
data packet transmission within traffic class i, which may also depend on the 








if capacity w remains constant, additional traffic within traffic class i





kit if traffic remains constant, additional bandwidth capacity will allow to 
speed up every data packet.17
Optimal prices for the different quality classes and optimal traffic capacity are 
determined simultaneously. Competitive behavior of the traffic service provider 
results in an optimal packet price for each traffic class and optimal traffic capac-
ities. We assume that there are zero income effects associated with the demand 
function  it P , so that the social net benefit of all packet transmission on the dif-
ferent traffic classes i=1,…, n over periods T is defined by:
(1) ) ( ) , ,... ( ~ ) ~ ( max
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Necessary conditions for the maximum may be found by differentiating (1) with 
respect to  nt t Q Q ,..., 1 for each t=1,…,T and with respect to w and setting each de-
rivative to zero.
The optimal pricing rule requires for a packet transmission within traffic class i
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Capacity is extended to the point where the marginal cost of an extra unit of ca-
pacity is equal to its marginal benefits of reduced congestion within the different 
traffic classes. 
Simultaneous solutions of equation (2) and (3) provide first-best allocation of 
traffic flows 
* *
1 ,..., nt t Q Q t=1,…,T as well as first-best capacity dimension w
*.
Even if traffic in the premium class is low, the delay imposed by high priority 
traffic to the traffic of subsequent classes may be substantial. The opportunity 18
costs of the transmission of data packets under strict priority scheduling are 
strongly determined by interclass externalities, the increasing delay of lower 
class packets being due to the transmission of premium class packets. In con-
trast, intraclass externalities in the upper classes may be neglected, if the quality 
standard is defined high enough, such that transmission quality is sufficient for 
all relevant applications independent of the traffic load in this class. If only in-

















































and the lowest traffic class has a data packet transmission price of zero.
Quality of service-based price differentiation allows users with heterogeneous 
demands for traffic quality to self select. Whereas users with high preference for 
priority traffic services have the possibility to pay a high user charge for high-
quality less congested traffic services, users with preferences for low quality 
more congested traffic services have to pay lower user charges.
4.2 Endogenous minimal traffic qualities
In the lowest traffic class the user charges according to interclass externalities 
are zero. Congestion results endogenously without traffic quality guarantee de-
pending on the demand for traffic in the different traffic class and the level of 
capacity which is used for all traffic classes. This minimal traffic quality of the 
lowest traffic class should not be confused with the best effort average traffic 
quality of TCP. 
Since in the lowest traffic class n no quality guarantee is provided, intraclass 
externalities are of particular relevance. If intraclass externality pricing is ap-19
plied, socially inefficient delay in traffic class n can be avoided. Within DiffServ 
architecture all data packets within the same class are treated equally, thus only 
average delay within a quality class is considered but not the individual delay of 
a packet depending on the position of the data packet within the queue at the 
router. The intraclass externality price in class n is always lower than the inter-
class externality price of class n-1. Due to top priority scheduling an additional 
data packet in class n-1 has priority before all packets in class n and therefore 
causes a larger delay on the packets in class n than an additional data packet 
within class n. Thus, the monotony requirements of traffic class prices are still 
fulfilled. 
Capacity is allocated endogenously between the different quality classes accord-
ing to the degree of heterogeneity between the different consumers. Since capac-
ity is chosen endogenously, an increase in the demand for high quality transmis-
sion with the resultant high opportunity costs of additional high quality traffic 
will lead to an incentive compatible capacity extension. When there is a popula-
tion of users who need more high priority transmission, a larger share of capaci-
ty is used for the high priority transmission. When there is a population of users 
who have strong preferences for low priority transmission, more capacity will be 
used for low priority transmission. As a consequence, minimal traffic quality in 
the lowest traffic class results endogenously.
5.  Summary and discussion of policy implications
The network neutrality debate is gaining increasing momentum worldwide. Its 
focus is on the regulation of Internet traffic management. Two different oppos-
ing approaches to traffic management regulation became relevant in the U.S. 
and in Europe. In the U.S. the FCC differentiates between reasonable network 
management and unreasonable discrimination. Paying for priority arrangements 
between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to 
favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. 
In Europe the focus is on minimum quality of service requirements. 20
In this paper a critical appraisal of traffic quality regulation has been provided. It 
is shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify 
the prohibition of priority pricing or the regulatory requirement of minimum 
traffic qualities. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay 
sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentia-
tion and complementary priority pricing.
The transmission of data packets belongs to the markets for Internet traffic ser-
vices. Due to the absence of irreversible costs in the provision of Internet logis-
tics, Internet traffic services do not possess the characteristics of monopolistic 
bottlenecks. They are, however, based on telecommunications infrastructure. By 
means of access regulation of local loop bottleneck components the transfer of 
market power from the telecommunications network bottleneck components into 
the complementary Internet access service markets can be avoided. Thus, any 
regulation of contracts between access service providers and Internet application 
service providers is not justified. 
Considering the disaggregated representation of the Internet the question arises 
at which submarkets universal service issues occur. Again it is important to dif-
ferentiate between the markets for communications infrastructure capacities and 
the markets for Internet traffic services. On the infrastructure level, the problem 
of a universal service and the related subsidy arises only for the case that in 
some areas local broadband access is not yet available. As more users possess 
the capability to send or receive large amounts of data packets via broadband 
access, traffic capacity management by Internet access service and backbone 
service providers becomes increasingly more important. In conclusion, the in-
creasing access to high-speed broadband infrastructure does not reduce the prob-
lem of scarcity of Internet traffic capacities, but may strongly aggravate it. It 
creates an urgent need for congestion based quality differentiation for broadband 
Internet traffic. 
On the level of Internet traffic services universal service problems may also 
arise. To the extent that Internet traffic for specific socially desired applications 
(tele-medicine, interactive video for schools etc.) should be used, best effort 21
TCP average quality is not sufficient. Such applications require priority traffic 
with guaranteed traffic qualities. Instead of prohibiting priority pricing, a subsi-
dy for the required premium traffic services may be necessary. 
Based on innovations in Internet traffic quality management architecture the ba-
sic characteristics of an economic pricing approach for traffic quality differentia-
tion are demonstrated. Since traffic quality is directly related to congestion 
externalities, the well-known congestion pricing models from transportation 
economics are extended for different traffic quality classes in order to show the
importance of priority pricing as well as the evolutionary development of mi-
nimal traffic qualities.
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